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Abstract
Lobbying is studied in a series of signaling game experiments. Students as well as professional
lobbyists are used as subjects. In contrast with some earlier studies, comparing students and pro-
fessionals, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences in the behavior of the two subject pools. Professional
subjects appear to behave more in line with the game–theoretic predictions, display a higher degree
of separation, and earn more money. We show that professional rules of conduct and profession-
alization can explain these differences. Although our results suggest that subject surrogacy is a
relevant issue in this ﬁeld of research, arguments are provided why experimentation with student
subjects remains useful to study lobbying. © 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Lobbying has become a growth industry in many countries. For example, for the US,
there are estimates listing as many as 100,000 persons that are now involved in ‘legislative
advocacy’ nationwide. 1 In Brussels, more than 10,000 are estimated to be involved in
interest representation, and the number of lobbyists in individual European countries is
rapidly growing. 2 The new profession of ‘political manager’ or ‘public affairs consultant’
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E-mail addresses: j.j.m.potters@kub.nl (J. Potters), fvwinden@fee.uva.nl (F. van Winden).
1 See National Lobbyist Directory, http://www.lobbyist.net.
2 See, e.g. The Economist, ‘The Brussels lobbyist and the struggle for ear time’, 15 August 1998, and ‘Time for
reform’, 24 September 1994 (speaking of an ‘explosive growth’ in the UK).
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is on its way, with its own associations, registers, standards of conduct, and educational
training. 3 At the same time, the potential inroad of lobbying on representative democracy
has become a regular issue in the media.
The strategic transmission of information, whereby a lobbyist is interested in persuading
a policymaker to choose a particular type of action, is generally considered to be at the
heart of lobbying (see, e.g. Potters and van Winden, 1992; Strauch, 1993; Austen-Smith,
1994). Although by now there is a large general literature on lobbying and related issues, 4
there exists only a small number of rigorous theoretical studies of the information transmis-
sion game between lobbyists and policymakers (for a review, see Austen-Smith, 1997), and
hardlyanyempiricalteststhereof.Thelatterisnotsosurprisinggiventheobviousdifﬁculty
of obtaining adequate data (cf. Potters and Sloof, 1996). In this respect, laboratory exper-
imentation seems to offer an interesting alternative method of research in this important
area.
In Potters and van Winden (1996), we used this method to investigate the behavior of
student subjects in a signaling game experiment designed to capture the basic features
of lobbying. In the setup chosen for this experiment, the sender (lobbyist) has private
information on the realization of some stochastic state variable which affects the payoffs
that the sender and the responder (policymaker) can get. Actual payoffs are determined by
the choice the responder has to make, given the value of the state variable. On the basis
of her prior incomplete information about this variable, the responder is inclined to take a
decision which is unfavorable for the sender. However, the sender can opt to send a (costly)
message to the responder in an attempt to change the responder’s beliefs about the state
variable, so that the responder will take a decision which is preferred by the sender. As
Section 2 will show, game theory provides sharp predictions for the outcome of this game.
Our experimental results clearly deviated from these predictions.
Although it is common in experimental economics to use students as subjects, in this
case a legitimate point of critique could be that, in order to learn something about lobby-
ing, one should use professionals as subjects. First, because students may not be familiar
with the intricacies of, and have no training in, the strategic transmission of information.
The experimental game described above is a relatively complex one. It involves incom-
plete information, interaction, a relatively large strategy set, and the absence of dominated
strategies. Since public affairs ofﬁcials may be expected to feel more familiar with such
an environment, which mimics some basic features of their ‘natural habitat’, it provides
an opportunity to them to behave differently. Experimental evidence suggests that more
complex situations are indeed necessary for professionals to show different behavior (see
Abdolmohammadi and Wright, 1987). Second, and perhaps more importantly, in reality
professional rules of conduct may play a signiﬁcant role. The latter point links up with the
growing interest in economics for the relevance of conventions and norms. Indeed, in pub-
lications distributed by professional lobbyists and their associations, standards of conduct
are frequently mentioned, as will be further discussed below.
3 See, e.g. American Society for Association Executives (http://www.asaenet.org/PublicPolicy), and The Grad-
uate School of Political Management of The George Washington University (http://www.gwu.edu/gspm).
4 See, for instance, the literature mentioned under the course requirements of The Graduate School of Political
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The main goals of this paper are to investigate whether indeed professional rules of
conduct have an impact and whether there are any signiﬁcant differences in the behavior of
professionals and students. To that purpose we replicated the signaling game experiment,
using experienced public affairs ofﬁcials (and additional students) as subjects.
Although in general it may not be easy to ﬁnd out what the rules of conduct are in
a particular profession, in our case we are helped by explicit statements in professional
publications. 5 We only reproduce the rules that are of potential relevance for our study.
In this respect, an important rule — present in all the publications referred to in footnote
5 — holds that the lobbyist should ‘never cheat or misinform’. A related rule frequently
mentioned is that one should ‘avoid conﬂicts of interest’, inducing a focus on ‘win-win’
situations. To indicate the relevance of these rules for the signaling game studied in this
paper it sufﬁces to note here that this game exhibits a dilemma structure: the equilibrium
outcome of the game is payoff dominated by a ‘cooperative’ (non-equilibrium) outcome.
In the equilibrium outcome, the responder is sometimes misinformed by the sender, and the
responder’schoicesaccommodatetothatfact.Intermsofexpectedpayoffs,thisequilibrium
outcome is worse for both the sender and the responder than the ‘cooperative’ outcome.
In case of the latter, a sender reveals his private information to the responder, enabling the
responder always to make the choice which is best for her. This outcome is only attainable,
however, if the sender can somehow resist the temptation to cheat. Another potentially
important rule of conduct put forward in this literature is that lobbyists should ‘closely
monitor the feedback from policymakers’, 6 since this rule could lead to a different form
of behavioral adjustment over time by the professionals in the experiment.
Finally, we note here that our second goal — searching for differences between student
and professional subjects — is also relevant for the nagging issue of ‘subject surrogacy’,
which is often raised by those who are sceptical about the results of experimental inquiry
in the social sciences. Experimentalists usually rebut the argument by pointing out that it
is not a criticism of the experimental method per se, but a plea for ‘selective replications’
with professionals from the ﬁeld (Plott, 1982; Kinder and Palfrey, 1993). Up till now,
remarkably few differences between students and professionals have been documented in
the experimental literature (see, e.g. Davis and Holt, 1993, p. 17). However, this evidence
shows a number of limitations. First of all, it is based on relatively few studies, with small
numbers of professionals. 7 Secondly, in contrast with standard procedures for student
subjects, subjects in these studies are sometimes not paid at all (e.g. Burns, 1985), or not
in the usual fashion (e.g. DeJong et al., 1988). Moreover, many of these studies involve
markets, which do not represent situations most likely to elicit differences in subject-pools
(Roth et al., 1991). On the basis of an extensive survey Ball and Cech (1996, p. 266)
5 See, e.g. the ‘Guidelines for Association Lobbyists’ and ‘Standards of Conduct’ of the American Society
of Association Executives (http://www.asaenet.org/PublicPolicy), the ‘Lobbyist Ethics Pledge’ of the Council for
EthicsinLegislativeAdvocacy,tobecomeacertiﬁedlobbyist(http://www.lobbyist.net),‘SomeLobbyingTactics’
by long time Australian-based political campaigner Aldis Ozols (http://www.zeta.au/aldis). See also Schlozman
and Tierney (1986) and Strauch (1993).
6 Strauch (1993, p. 45) refers to this rule as one of the ‘methods of lobbying’ (Genaue Beachtung des Feedback
von den Entscheidungsträgern).
7 For instance, there are only nine professionals in Burns (1985), seven in DeJong et al. (1988), and 8–10 in Dyer
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conclude: “The combined evidence (:::) seems to suggest that, in environments where
probability and risk play a major role, research using students subjects has the potential to
produceanomalousresultsandeffortsshouldbemadetoreplicateresultsusingsubjectsfrom
more representative populations.” 8 For all these reasons, replications with professionals,
particularly concerning institutional settings other than markets, are called for. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study of subject surrogacy involving a signaling game.
Moreover, this study differs from earlier investigations by using a relatively large number
of professionals (30) and ‘adequate’ monetary rewards (see Section 3).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the signaling game and its the-
oretical properties. It also presents the hypotheses to be tested. Experimental procedures
are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 contains the experimental results and the tests of the
hypotheses. Section 5 concludes.
2. Game and hypotheses
Thesignalinggameunderlyingourexperimenthastwoplayers:asenderSandaresponder
R (in the experiment neutrally labeled as participant A and B, respectively). The latter has
to decide between two choices, labeled B1 and B2. The payoffs received by R and S are
determinedbythechoiceselectedbyRandtherealizationofastochasticstatevariablek(in
theexperiment,thecolorofadisk),whichcantakethevaluewhiteorblack.Therealization
of this variable is private information to S; R only knows the prior odds that the value of k
is white (2/3) or black (1/3). After the realization of k, but before R makes her decision, S
has to decide whether or not to send a message to R. Sending a message bears a ﬁxed cost,
c, to S only. Sending no message is costless. In case S decides to send a message, he has
to select the content of the message, which can be either ‘the color is white’ or ‘the color
is black’. After R is informed about the choice of S (no message, ‘white’, or ‘black’), R
chooses between B1 and B2.
We decided to focus on two parameter conﬁgurations (treatments). In treatment L, the
cost c of sending a message is relatively low (0.5 Dutch guilders), whereas in treatment H
this cost is relatively high (1.5 guilders). The game–theoretic predictions of the effect of the
cost differential are clear-cut and will be explained below. The payoffs in guilders to R and
S as a function of the choice by R (B1 or B2) and the value of k (white or black) are shown
in Table 1. The sender’s payoffs differ per treatment. If we had only changed the cost to S
of sending a message, the expected equilibrium payoffs to S would have been different in
the two treatments, and also different from R’s expected payoff in at least one treatment. To
give the game–theoretic predictions their best chance, by minimizing the potential effects
of motivations like fairness or altruism, we chose to have a design where the expected
equilibrium payoffs are the same over the two players’ roles and over the two treatments.
Note from the payoffs in Table 1 that the players have a common interest when the color
is black: both prefer B2. However, if the color is white their interests conﬂict: R prefers to
8 Anderson and Sunder (1995) found professional traders in an experimental auction to be more risk-averse
and more accurate in estimating probabilities than students. On the other hand, Dyer et al. (1989) report that the
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Table 1
Payoffs (in Dutch guilders) to sender and receiver in the two treatments depending on the color of the disk (white
or black) and the choice of the receiver (B1 or B2)
Payoff to S, R R’s choice
B1 B2
Low message cost (cD0.5)
State White (PD2/3) 2, 3 4,1
k Black (PD1/3) 1, 0 7, 1
High message cost (cD1.5)
State White (PD2/3) 1.5, 3 3.5, 1
k Black (PD1/3) 1.5, 0 5.5, 1
play B1, but S (again) prefers R to play B2. This illustrates the basic dilemma faced by the
players. When the color is black S would like to send a message to R to reveal his private
information, and it would be in R’s interest to believe S’s message. However, given that R
is inclined to believe messages, S will be tempted to send a message to R — saying that the
color is black — even when the color is in fact white. Realizing this, R is likely to maintain
some healthy skepticism towards S’s messages.
To indicate the game–theoretic predictions for the signaling game, we introduce some
notation ﬁrst. Let S’s strategy be denoted by k(s). It represents the probability that S sends
signal s, with s2fn,‘w’,‘b’g, given the color k2fw(hite),b(lack)g, where the signals n, ‘w’,
and ‘b’, stand for no message, ‘the color is white’, and ‘the color is black’, respectively.
Furthermore, let R’s strategy be denoted by (s), which represents the probability that the
responder chooses B2 given R’s signal s.
Focusing on sequential equilibria, it is ﬁrst noted that every message (‘w’ or ‘b’) sent
with positive probability should have the same effect on the responders choice, that is,
(‘w’)D(‘b’). As the decision to send a message implies the ﬁxed cost c, no matter its
content,thecontentitself(‘w’or‘b’)isequivalenttocheaptalk.Fortheequilibriumanalysis
of the game this implies that we can disregard the content of the message and proceed as
if the signal space contains only two elements: no message (n) and a message (m), with
k:Dk(m)D1−k(n), kDb,w.
Thereisasequentialequilibriumforthisgameinwhichthesenderneversendsamessage,
kD0, kDw,b. Since the two ‘types’ of the sender pool in this equilibrium, the responder
will base her choice on her prior beliefs and opt for choice B1: (n)D0. As the sequential
equilibriumconceptdoesnotrestrictR’sbeliefincaseshemightreceiveanoff-equilibrium
message, R is allowed to play B1 in that event, that is, (m)D0. However, the beliefs that
supportthisequilibriumfailtopassthestrongerreﬁnementstests—likeUniversalDivinity
(BanksandSobel,1987)—thathavebeenproposedtoexcludeimplausibleoff-equilibrium
beliefs. The intuition for this failure is that R should realize that a costly message is more
likely to be sent by S when the color is black, because this sender type has a larger stake in
trying to persuade S to choose B2.
Itturnsoutthatthereisauniquesequentialequilibriumthatsatisﬁesallofthereﬁnements.
For expositional reasons, we derive this equilibrium in an informal way (for formal proofs,
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in trying to persuade R, by sending a costly message, when the color is black. Hence we
have that b>w, as perfect pooling via wDbD1 cannot be optimal (for in that case a
message would reveal no information to R, and thus, lead to (m)D0). Realizing that a
message is more likely to be sent when the color is black, and no message when the color
is white, R will respond with (m)>(n)D0. Obviously, (m)D1 cannot hold, because then
each sender type would like to send a costly message for sure. Hence, we must have that
0<(m)<1, which requires that the responder is indifferent between choosing B1 or B2
when a message is received. Now, given a positive response by R to a costly message, it
should follow that bD1 whenever w>0, because S has a strictly larger stake in sending
a message when kDb. Hence, we must have that bD1>w>0, since w>0 is required
to make the responder indifferent. But this implies that the sender should be indifferent
between sending a message and not sending a message, when kDw. It is straightforward to
verify that these two conditions — the sender being indifferent when the color is white, and
the responder when she receives a message — can be satisﬁed simultaneously if and only
if wD1/4, in both treatments, and (m)D1/4 in treatment L and (m)D3/4 in treatment H.
It follows that increasing the cost to the sender of sending a message should (only) have a
positive impact on the receiver’s response to a costly message. Summarizing we have the
following equilibrium predictions:
TreatmentL.Lowmessagecost/ : w D 1
4; b D 1; . n/ D 0; . m/ D 1
4
TreatmentH.Highmessagecost/ : w D 1
4; b D 1; . n/ D 0; . m/ D 3
4
Having described the nature of the game and its equilibrium outcomes, we are now in the
position to formulate our hypotheses. We start out with some general hypotheses concern-
ing the qualitative (comparative) aspects of the sequential equilibrium predictions. These
hypotheses are of interest in themselves, and they prepare the ground for the remaining
hypotheses pertaining to differences between student and professional subjects. We do
not merely focus on the quantitative ‘point predictions’ because these values are derived
under the assumption of strict selﬁshness and risk neutrality. The qualitative aspects of
these predictions are not, or at least to a much lesser extent, dependent on the actual pay-
off and risk attitudes of the players. Since strategies cannot be directly observed, we will
use the empirical frequency with which a message is sent in case of color k (denoted
by sk), and the empirical frequency with which B2 is chosen in case of signal s (denoted
by r(s)).
Hypothesis 1 (Signaling). (i) Senders engage in costly signaling, with sb>sw; (ii) respon-
ders are inﬂuenced by costly signals: r(m)>r(n).
Hypothesis 2 (Treatment effect). Only the impact of a message increases with its cost:
r(m)treatH>r(m)treatL.
In this study, we are particularly interested in the extent to which these hypotheses apply
differentlytostudentsandprofessionals.Fortheformulationofourhypothesespertainingto
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of students and professionals are typically small and insigniﬁcant. Therefore, we take as
our null-hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.0. There are no signiﬁcant differences in the observed behavior of the two
subject pools.
As mentioned in Section 1, counterevidence has been mainly attributed to the following
factors: familiarity (ﬁeld-experience) with the environment, a different risk-attitude, and
rules of conduct developed in the ﬁeld. It is important to note that these factors mainly
pertaintotheprofessionalsintheirroleassenders.Publicaffairsmanagersareprofessionally
skilled to transmit information and to inﬂuence the beliefs and behavior of policymakers or
otherrelevantaudiences.Theyarenotnecessarilymoreskilledinprocessingandevaluating
information.Therefore,ifatall,wewouldexpectdifferencesbetweenthetwosubjectpools
mainly to show up in the behavior of the senders in our signaling experiments.
Theﬁrstfactor,inparticularthefamiliaritywithstrategicinformationtransmission,could
show up in behavior by professionals that is more closely in line with the game–theoretic
predictions than the behavior of students. The second factor could reinforce this behav-
ioral difference to the extent that professionals are less risk-averse (more risk-neutral), as
suggested by Dyer et al. (1989). Therefore, we take as our ﬁrst alternative hypothesis:
Hypothesis3.1(Gamesmenship). Thebehavioroftheprofessionalsintheirroleassenders
is closer to the (risk-neutral) game–theoretic predictions than that of the student subjects.
Another way in which familiarity with strategic information transmission could unfold
is that the professional senders are able to achieve higher earnings. By playing the reﬁned
sequential equilibrium, in each treatment both senders and responders can expect to earn
two guilders. If, however, the senders can somehow achieve full separation (bD1, wD0
and r(n)D0, r(m)D1) their expected earnings are 3.5 guilders in treatment L and 2.33
guildersintreatmentH.Inthatcasetheexpectedearningsoftheresponderswillriseto2.33
guilders. Hence, there are substantial incentives to arrive at this, ‘cooperative’, separating
outcome. However, this requires that the senders succeed in establishing a higher degree
of information disclosure (b−wD1) than in the equilibrium outcome (b−wD3/4).
Senders should, in particular, refrain from sending deceitful messages when the color is
white.Perhaps,professionalexperiencewithinformationtransmissionorprofessionalrules
of conduct, such as the ‘never cheat or misinform’ rule discussed in Section 1, could make
thecooperativeoutcomeagreaterattractorfortheprofessionalsthanthestudents.Therefore,
we formulate:
Hypothesis 3.2 (Separation and earnings). Professional senders show a higher degree of
separation (sb−sw) and/or achieve higher earnings than student subjects in the same role.
Our ﬁnal hypothesis concerns patterns of learning and adaptation. Professional rules
of conduct could have two opposite effects here. On the one hand, the emphasis in the
professional lobbying literature on monitoring the reactions of opponents (‘closely monitor
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experience in the experiment than the response exhibited by students. Given the lack of
transparency of the institutional environment in which lobbying takes place, such a rule is
quite understandable. On the other hand, more static rules of conduct, like the ‘never cheat
or misinform’ rule, could manifest themselves in a weaker response to experience by the
professionals.Ifprofessionalsapplysuchrulesofthumbintheexperimenttheymaybeless
inclined to adapt their behavior in response to observations in the experiment (Burns, 1985;
Mestelman and Feeny, 1988). Hence, a priori it is not clear in which direction any effects
of professional rules of conduct are likely to go. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.3 (Learning and adaptation). In comparison with student subjects, profes-
sionals display different patterns of learning and adaptation in response to experience in the
experiment.
NotethatthealternativeHypotheses3.1–3.3areneithermutuallyexclusivenornecessar-
ily compatible. For example, gamesmenship is perfectly compatible with a weak response
to experience, but (in a strict sense) it conﬂicts with achieving a cooperative outcome. This
reﬂects the scarcity of evidence on subject-pools effects, which calls for a more exploratory
approach concerning the locus and direction of such effects.
3. Experimental design and procedures




were conducted under the low cost treatment (PL1 and PL2), and one under the high cost
treatment (PH1). Each session had 10 or 12 subjects as players and one subject to perform
the role of monitor (observer). Table 2 provides some information on the characteristics of
the sessions. All the sessions with professionals — which took place at a conference center
— were of the ‘pen and paper’ type. In case of the students, four of the six sessions under
eachtreatmentwerealsoconductedwithpenandpaper.Themainreasonwasthatwedidnot
have a computerized laboratory at the time of the ﬁrst sessions. The remaining two student
sessions under each treatment were conducted by computer in the CREED-laboratory in
Amsterdam. Of course, procedures were duplicated as much as possible. This appeared
to be successful, since no signiﬁcant differences were found between the two modes of
conducting the experiment (if anything, slightly more ‘cheating’ messages were sent in the
computer mode).
Student subjects were recruited among the undergraduate student population of the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam. In announcements, they were requested to participate in a 2h ex-
perimental study of decision making which would earn them money. The majority of the
participants were economics majors.
After a short introduction in the reception room, the student subjects were randomly
assigned a role (sender, responder, or monitor) by picking an envelope which contained
the role. Once the subjects and the monitor were seated in the laboratory — at tables withJ. Potters, F. van Winden/J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 43 (2000) 499–522 507
Table 2
Session characteristics
Session Treata Poolb No. of subjects Modec Date
PL1 Low Prof 10 p&p 5/92
PL2 Low Prof 10 p&p 1/93
PH1 High Prof 10 p&p 1/93
SL1 Low Stud 12 p&p 1/92
SL2 Low Stud 12 p&p 3/92
SL3 Low Stud 12 p&p 4/94
SL4 Low Stud 12 p&p 4/94
SL5 Low Stud 12 comp 4/94
SL6 Low Stud 12 comp 4/94
SH1 High Stud 12 p&p 1/92
SH2 High Stud 12 p&p 3/92
SH3 High Stud 12 p&p 4/93
SH4 High Stud 10 p&p 4/93
SH5 High Stud 12 comp 4/93
SH6 High Stud 12 comp 4/93
a Low: low cost; high: high cost (parameter treatment).
b Prof: professionals; stud: students.
c p&p: pen and paper; comp: computerized.
partitions — the instructions were distributed and read aloud (an English translation of the
instructions is provided in Appendix A). In the instructions, senders and responders were,
respectively, called A and B participants. The message character of the sender’s signal was
retained in the experiment. Senders had to decide to send a message (‘white’ or ‘black’) or
to send ‘no message’. Responder’s choices were labeled B1 and B2. The student sessions
consisted of two parts, each part beginning with one practice period followed by 10 periods
(rounds) of play. Instructions for the second part were read only after the ﬁrst part was
ﬁnished. The only difference between the parts was that subjects changed roles (senders
becameresponders,andviceversa).Becauseofthetimeconstraintattheconferenceswhere
the sessions with the professionals were held (see below), we were not able to conduct this
second part with the professionals. Therefore, only the data of part 1 of the student sessions
will be used for comparison with the professionals.
The professional subjects were recruited among the subscribers to two different confer-
ences on public affairs, one held in Amsterdam (PL1) and the other in The Hague (PL2
and PH1). They were informed by mail that participation in a 1h experimental study of
decisionmaking,whichwouldearnthemmoney,wasoptional.Participantswereexecutives
and, in particular, public affairs and public relations ofﬁcers from the private and the public
sector. Experimental procedures were identical to those of the student sessions, except that
the sessions with professionals were held in a conference room. Moreover, we quadrupled
their payoffs and message costs. The payoffs in Table 1 are based on the convention in
experimental economics that subjects should, on average, at least be paid the opportunity
cost of participation. The expected equilibrium earnings of 20 guilders in 1h (10 rounds
of play, with an expected payoff of two guilders per play) are above the 15 guilders that a
student would typically earn per hour in an odd job, such as working in a bar or restaurant.508 J. Potters, F. van Winden/J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 43 (2000) 499–522
For the professionals, comparable monetary incentives were less easy to determine in view
of the fact they had already subscribed to participate in the conference before signing up for
the experiment. After consulting a public affairs consultancy ﬁrm, that was involved in the
organization of one of the conferences, it was decided to multiply the payoffs and message
cost by four. As a result, their expected equilibrium earnings were 80 guilders for 1h. 9
All subjects (students and professionals) participated only once, and no one had previ-
ously taken part in a similar experiment.
After the instructions were read the procedures were as follows. In every period, each
sender was matched with a responder. Subjects could not know whom they were matched
with in any period. The matching scheme was determined randomly before the experiment
under the constraint that no match would stay the same for two (or more) consecutive
periods, nor occur more than twice during the 10 periods. 10 Subjects were informed about
this constraint. Moreover, the matching scheme was handed out to the monitor, so that (s)he
could check the procedure if (s)he so desired. In each period the game presented in the
previous section was played according to the following rules. At the start of the period a
white or black disk (checker) was drawn by the monitor from an urn. Whereas all subjects
knew that the urn contained one black and two white disks, the disk drawn by the monitor
was only revealed to the subjects playing the role of sender. After seeing the color of the
disk a sender decided whether or not to send a message to the unknown responder he or
she was paired with in that period. In case of a message, the sender had to choose between
the announcement (the disk is) ‘white’ or ‘black’. Sending a message involved a ﬁxed cost
for the sender (as indicated in Table 1). After the sender had recorded her or his decision,
it was privately communicated to the responder, and the responder had to choose between
B1 and B2. This choice was then communicated privately to the sender and the color of the
disk was revealed to the responder (by the monitor). Results for the other pairs of subjects
were not revealed.
Possible payoffs were presented in tables (see Appendix A) and expressed in guilders.
They were also projected on a wall, for all to see. Earnings were privately paid in cash at
the end of the experiment, after the completion of a questionnaire.
The only difference between the sessions with professionals and students was that, after
10 periods of play, students changed roles and proceeded with another 10 rounds of play
(without knowing that they would do so until after the completion of the ﬁrst 10 periods).
The only difference between the computer sessions and the pen and paper sessions was that
messagesandchoiceswerecommunicatedtotheotherplayerbythecomputerintheformer,
and by us in the latter (by marking the appropriate columns on subjects’ record sheets). In
both types of sessions the monitor could check, using the matching scheme, whether the
decisions made by the subjects corresponded with those communicated.
9 Taking an estimated yearly net income of 150,000 guilders as point of departure, the net salary of professionals
is about 80 guilders per hour.
10 The main reason to have randomly matched pairs instead of ﬁxed pairs, is that we wanted to mimic the one-shot
character of the game-theoretic equilibrium predictions as closely as possible while at the same time allowing the
subjects to learn and adapt their behavior in response to experience.J. Potters, F. van Winden/J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 43 (2000) 499–522 509
Table 3
Frequencies of messages when the color was white (sw, ﬁrst entry) or black (sb, second entry), averaged over the
session aggregatesa
sw, sb
L (low cost) H (high cost) Row average
Professionals 0.515 (0.243), 0.834 (0.047) 0.343 (0.000), 0.933 (0.000) 0.457 (0.198), 0.867 (0.067)
Students 0.549 (0.110), 0.688 (0.117) 0.373 (0.166), 0.710 (0.108) 0.461 (0.163), 0.699 (0.108)
Column average 0.540 (0.132), 0.724 (0.121) 0.368 (0.152), 0.742 (0.130) 0.460 (0.162), 0.732 (0.121)
a Standard deviations in parentheses.
4. Results
In this section, we discuss the experimental results in relation to the hypotheses formu-
latedinSection2.Aprincipalquestiontobeaddressedﬁrst,iswhattotakeasanobservation.
There are three possibilities: each play of the game, each individual subject, or each ses-
sion. In total, we have 15 sessions, with in each session 10 rounds of a particular game,
played by either ﬁve (sessions PL1, PL2, PH1 and SH4) or six pairs of subjects (SL1–SL6,
SH1–SH3, SH5 and SH6). Hence, there are 15 session level observations, 172 subject level
observations, and 860 game level observations. Because of dependency of observations at
the individual level, we will use the observations at the session level for the tests of our
hypotheses. 11 Furthermore, throughout we will base our statistical conclusions on non-
parametric tests (Wilcoxon’s signed-ranks test for matched pairs, and the Mann–Whitney
U-test for independent pairs), using P<0.10 (one-tailed) as threshold for signiﬁcant effects.
We start with testing the general Hypotheses 1 and 2 presented in Section 2, concerning
theoccurrenceofsignalingandtreatmenteffects.Table3presentstheobservedfrequencies
with which costly messages were sent by senders when the color was white (sw) or black
(sb).Theﬁguresrepresentaveragesoverthesessions,wherewedistinguishbetweensubject
pools (students and professionals) and treatments (low message cost and high message
cost). Table 4 gives similar ﬁgures for the responders: the frequency of B2 choices when
no message was received, r(n), and when a message was received, r(m). 12
11 Analysisofthedatarevealsthattakingindividualsubjectdataasunitofobservationwoulddisregardsigniﬁcant
dependencies within sessions. In particular, analyses of variance as well as Kruskal–Wallis tests show signiﬁcant
differencesbetweensessionswiththesameexperimentaldesign(i.e.withthesametreatmentandsubjectpool)for
several of the main variables of interest. Also, Mann–Whitney tests reveal signiﬁcant differences between some
of the sessions with the same design in pairwise comparisons. Therefore, we take the more conservative approach
and use session aggregates as units of observation.
12 In the analysis reported in the text, we decided to pool ‘white’ and ‘black’ messages: skDsk(w)Csk(b). This is
not because the content makes no difference. It turns out that ‘black’ messages are reacted to more strongly by
respondersthan‘white’messages:r(b)>r(w)>r(n).However,thefrequencyof‘white’messagesistoolowtoallow
for a powerful statistical analysis. For example, in one session only one ‘white’ message occurred. Furthermore,
none of the results depends in any way on this pooling over message content. Also, there are no signs in the data
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Table 4
Frequencies of B2 choices after no message (r(n), ﬁrst entry) and after a message (r(m), second entry), averaged
over the session aggregatesa
r(n), r(m)
L (low cost) H (high cost) Row average
Professionals 0.076 (0.006), 0.267 (0.094) 0.250 (0.000), 0.654 (0.000) 0.134 (0.101), 0.396 (0.233)
Students 0.061 (0.104), 0.273 (0.106) 0.042 (0.038), 0.501 (0.105) 0.052 (0.076), 0.387 (0.156)
Column average 0.065 (0.088), 0.272 (0.096) 0.071 (0.086), 0.523 (0.112) 0.068 (0.084), 0.389 (0.164)
a Standard deviations in parentheses.
Hypothesis 1 (Signaling). From Tables 3 and 4 it is evident that senders engaged in costly
signaling (sb>sw), and that responders reacted in the expected direction to these signals
(r(m)>r(n)). The average frequency of messages was 0.732 in case the color of the disk was
black(sb),and0.460whenthecolorwaswhite(sw).ThedifferenceissigniﬁcantatPD0.001,
usingaone-tailedWilcoxontestwithsessionaggregatesasobservations.Responderschose
B2 at a rate of 0.389 when they received a message (r(m)), and at a rate of 0.068 when they
received no message (r(n)). Using the same test, the difference is again highly signiﬁcant
(PD0.001). 13
Hypothesis 2 (Treatment effect). According to the predictions of the reﬁned sequential
equilibrium, the higher cost of a message for the sender in treatment H, in comparison with
treatment L, should (only) increase the impact of a message. This leads to the expectation
that r(m)H>r(m)L, which is supported by the data. As Table 4 shows, responders chose
B2 at a rate of 0.523 after a message in treatment H, and at a rate of 0.272 in treatment L
(averaged over the sessions). The difference is signiﬁcant at PD0.001, using a one-tailed
Mann–Whitney test.
Also in line with the hypothesis is that no signiﬁcant treatment effect on the frequencies
of sb and r(n) is found, using the same test. However, with respect to messages in case
the color was white (sw) it turns out that these were sent at a signiﬁcantly higher rate
when the cost of doing so was relatively low. As Table 3 shows, this frequency is 0.540 in
treatment L and 0.368 in treatment H (averaged over sessions). The difference is signiﬁcant
at PD0.029. Apparently, senders send more messages when the cost c of doing so, relative
to the potential beneﬁt, is low. This relative cost equals 0.25D0.5/(4–2) in treatment L and
0.75D1.5/(3.5–1.5) in treatment H (see Table 1). Although this outcome may seem rather
intuitive, it was not to be expected on the basis of the game–theoretic analysis. 14
13 The value of r(n)D0.250 for the professionals in the high cost treatment is remarkably high. As a consequence,
taking all session data, the value of r(n) is signiﬁcantly higher for professionals than for students at PD0.10 with a
two-tailed test. This, however, is entirely due to one professional subject who chose B2 in each of the 10 periods,
irrespectiveofwhetheramessagewassentornot.Possiblythissubjectwantedtomaximizethesumofthepayoffs
to sender and receiver. In any case, if this subject were excluded as an outlier, then we would have r(n)D0.050
(and r(m)D0.570) for this session and there would be no difference between professionals and students.
14 Ageneralpropertyofmixedstrategyequilibriaisthattheplayerskeeponeanotherindifferent.Asaconsequence,
the change of a payoff parameter of player S has an impact on the strategy of player R but not on player S’s own
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The results presented so far are in line with our earlier experimental ﬁndings, which
showed that the sequential equilibrium outcomes fail as accurate predictions of the ex-
perimental results. A further discussion of the extent to which the results do support the
equilibrium predictions is beyond the scope of the present paper. For a detailed analysis,
the reader is referred to our earlier paper (Potters and van Winden, 1996). We turn now to
an investigation of the Hypotheses 3.0–3.3 which are the main focus of this paper. 15 These
hypotheses relate to potential differences between students and professionals in terms of
gamesmen-like behavior (Hypothesis 3.1), cooperative behavior and earnings (Hypothesis
3.2), and the behavioral response to experience (Hypothesis 3.3). Our null-hypothesis (Hy-
pothesis 3.0) is that there are no signiﬁcant differences in the behavior of the two subject
pools.
Hypothesis3.1(Gamesmenship). Thereﬁnedsequentialequilibriumprescribesforsenders
(under strict selﬁshness and risk-neutrality) that a costly message should always be sent
when the color is black, sbD1, and at a rate of swD1/4 when the color is white. One




that the difference in prediction error depends entirely on sb, which is signiﬁcantly larger
(at PD0.015, one-tailed) for professionals (0.867) than for students (0.699), whereas sw is
almost identical for professionals (0.457) and students (0.461).
Hence, we ﬁnd weak evidence that the professionals’ behavior is more in line with the
game–theoretic predictions (reﬁned sequential equilibrium) than that of the students. The
difference rests on sb which is closer to the theoretically predicted value of bD1 for
professionals than for students. In other words, if the state of the world is such that both
sender and receiver would beneﬁt from the choice of B2 by the receiver (no conﬂict of
interest), professional subjects are more likely than students to send a message in order to
sway the beliefs of the receiver, as they should according to the theoretical prediction.
Hypothesis 3.2 (Separation and earnings). In case professional subjects would behave
according to the rules of conduct mentioned in Section 1 (‘never cheat or misinform’ and
‘avoid conﬂicts of interest’), one would expect more cooperative behavior — that is, sb
closer to 1 and sw closer to 0 — for the professionals. At any rate, one would expect the
professional senders to achieve a higher degree of separation and information disclosure.
We have already seen that sb meets this expectation, whereas sw does not. As a result, the
degree of separation (sb−sw) is higher for professionals (0.410) than for students (0.238),
but the difference is not signiﬁcant (PD0.145 with a one-tailed Mann–Whitney test).
15 The signiﬁcance levels found with respect to signaling and the treatment effect show that 15 (session) observa-
tions are sufﬁcient for nonparametric tests to pick up effects that are strong and systematic.
16 If we weigh the prediction errors |b−sb| and |w−sw| with the expected prior probability of the relevant color
(1/3 and 2/3, respectively) then the difference between the two pools is somewhat smaller (0.182 for professionals
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Fig. 1. Development of the degree of separation.
A look at the development of separation corroborates this picture. Fig. 1 presents the
degree of separation (sb;t−sw;t) for each of the 10 periods, averaged over sessions for
each subject pool. It appears that in all periods the professionals achieve a larger degree
of separation, but that the differences are not very pronounced, especially not in the ﬁnal
periods. In the last two periods, the professionals achieve a degree of separation of only
0.20, much below the level of b−wD0.75 that is theoretically predicted.
Withrespecttoearnings,itturnsoutthattheprofessionalsearnedmoremoneyintheirrole
of senders than the students. Using the student payoff parameters for comparison, average
earnings per period are 2.10 guilders for professionals and 1.86 guilders for students. The
difference is not signiﬁcant though (PD0.147, one-tailed). This is partly due to the fact
that the colors drawn were a little less favorable for the professional senders (30% black
disks) than for the student senders (38% black disks). If we take the prior probability that
a black disk (33%) or a white disk (67%) is drawn to calculate expected earnings, given
the behavior of the subjects, then the difference between the two pools becomes signiﬁcant
(PD0.090, one-tailed).
Finally, it is interesting to take a closer look at individual behavior. In particular, we
examine the fraction of subjects engaging in perfect separation (sbD1 and swD0), since this
kind of behavior would be in line with the rule of conduct of ‘never cheat or misinform’.
It turns out that the average fraction of subjects adhering to this rule is larger for the
professionals (0.20) than for the students (0.04). The difference is signiﬁcant at PD0.068
(one-tailed Mann–Whitney test, with session averages as observations). Interestingly, the
three (out of 15) professionals which strictly adhere to this rule of perfect separation are
responsibleformostofthedifferencesbetweenthetwosubjectpools.Excludingthesubjects
engaged in perfect separation (three professionals and three students) from the data and
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and earnings all but disappear. The only difference remaining concerns sb, which stays
signiﬁcantly larger for the professionals (PD0.035).
Summarizing, we ﬁnd evidence that the professionals disclose more information, and
that (as a result) they earn more money. Also, the fraction of subjects that perfectly separate
(sbD1 and swD0) is signiﬁcantly larger for professionals than for students. In fact, it is this
small fraction of perfectly separating professionals (20%) that is responsible for most of
the differences between the two subject pools.
Hypothesis 3.3 (Learning and adaptation). Subjects received full feedback information on
the choices and earnings in the plays of the game they themselves participated in (thus, not
regarding sender–responder pairs that they were no party to). We relate the behavior of the
senders to this information in the following two ways, which distinguish between belief
learning and rote learning (Selten, 1991). Under the former type of learning subjects adapt
their behavior to experience via its impact on their beliefs. More speciﬁcally, subjects are
here hypothesized to increase the frequency of choices which are a best response to the
aggregate history of play, using the observed frequencies of choices by opponents to update
theirbeliefsaboutthesechoices. 17 Incaseofrotelearning,asimplestimulus-responsepro-
cess is assumed. In that case subjects are hypothesized to increase (decrease) the frequency
of choices which turned out to be successful (unsuccessful) in the previous period of play,
where success is deﬁned by higher earnings than in the immediately preceding round of
play (t−2). 18
Westartwiththecognitivelymoredemandinglearningmodelof‘bestresponsetohistory’
(BRTH), which is closest in spirit to gamesmen behavior. Averaged over the sessions we
ﬁnd that a message was sent at a rate of 0.756 when it was BRTH to do so, and at a rate of
0.455 when it was BRTH not to do so. The difference is highly signiﬁcant (PD0.001 with
one-tailed Wilcoxon test using the 15 session aggregates as observations). Furthermore, the
magnitudeoftheeffect[sk(BRTHDm)−sk(BRTHDn)]issomewhatsmallerforprofession-
als (0.232) than for students (0.320), but the difference between the two subject pools is
not signiﬁcant (PD0.448 with a two-tailed Mann–Whitney test). 19 The conclusion is that
there is signiﬁcant evidence of belief learning, in the direction of BRTH, but no support for
a signiﬁcant subject-pool effect.
So what about rote learning? It turns out that, indeed, relatively more messages occurred
when sending a message had been successful, or sending no message had been unsuccess-
ful, in the previous round (0.651 versus 0.522). The difference is signiﬁcant at PD0.039
(one-tailed Wilcoxon test). Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect is a bit larger for pro-
17 For each sender in a particular period t we calculate the cumulative frequencies of r(m)t−1 and r(n)t−1 up to
that period. Then, we determine whether the value of r(m)t−1−r(n)t−1 multiplied by the gain for the sender when
B2 instead of B1 is chosen exceeds the cost of sending a message. If this is (not) the case, then (not) sending a
message is the best response to history.
18 Thus, for senders, if sending a message (no message) in the previous period earned them more (less) than in
the preceding period (t−2) this should increase the frequency with which messages are sent in period t; otherwise,
this frequency should decrease.
19 We take a two-tailed test here because Hypothesis 3.3 does not indicate whether we should expect a stronger
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fessionals (0.156) than for students (0.122), but this difference is not signiﬁcant (PD0.820
with a two-tailed Mann–Whitney test). Thus, there are also signs of rote learning, but the
evidence is weaker than for belief learning. Furthermore, again no support for a signiﬁcant
subject-pool effect is found. 20
Summarizing, we ﬁnd support for learning — mainly in the direction of best response
to history, as in our earlier study (Potters and van Winden, 1996) — but no evidence of
signiﬁcant or systematic differences between the two subject pools. Consequently, we ﬁnd
no evidence for a differential impact of the professional rule of conduct ‘closely monitor
the feedback from policymakers’, mentioned in Section 1.
5. Concluding discussion
Our experimental study of lobbying shows that professional lobbyists behave more in
line with game–theoretic predictions, show a higher degree of information disclosure (sep-
aration), and earn more money. 21 These results are driven by two ﬁndings. First, compared
with student subjects, professionals send more frequently costly messages when there is no
conﬂictofinterestwiththeresponder(i.e.sb islarger).Second,asmallgroupofprofession-
als (20%) always sends a message if there is no conﬂict of interest with the responder, and
they never send a message if such a conﬂict exists; in other words, they perfectly separate
(i.e. sbD1 and swD0). Among the student subjects only 4% behave in this way. Except for
sb, all differences between students and professionals disappear if these perfect separators
are excluded from the data. Our conjecture is that both ﬁndings can best be explained by
professional rules of conduct, as discussed in Section 1. One frequently mentioned rule
— ‘avoid conﬂicts of interests’, focusing attention on ‘win-win’ situations — may induce
professional lobbyists to be relatively keener on taking costly action when the responder is
likely to make a decision which runs counter to the interests of both. This may explain the
larger value of sb. On the other hand, the most frequently mentioned rule that we found —
‘never cheat or misinform’ — is strikingly in line with the behavior of the perfect separa-
tors. However, the fact that only a small group behaved according to this important rule of
conduct would then suggest a limited extent of professionalization. We will return to this
issue below.
A natural question that can be raised in this context is to what extent our signaling game
resembles ‘real-life lobbying’. In this respect it is noted that providing policymakers with
information is often considered to be one of the most important means to inﬂuence the
20 This conclusion does not change when, for the deﬁnition of success, earnings obtained with a particular choice
(action) in the previous period are compared with its average earnings up to that period.
21 Apartfromtheaboveanalyseswealsocomparedthetwosubjectpoolsinotherrespects,suchasthebehaviorin
the ﬁrst and last period(s), and the variance in behavior within the two pools. With respect to variance in behavior,
it is noted that DeJong et al. (1988) found that businessmen exhibited greater variance in market behavior than
students. However, we found no differences between the two pools in any other respect than the ones reported in
the main text. We also looked at the differences between the two subject pools in their role of responders. We did
not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant or systematic differences. For example, the professional responders do not behave more
in line with the game-theoretic predictions, do not respond to messages more strongly (r(m)−r(n)) (see, however,
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policymaking process. As Ornstein and Elder (1978, p. 75) put it: “the ability of a group to
command facts, ﬁgures, and technical information in support of its positions is another key
organizational resource. (:::) a group that can provide persuasive data to support its case
has an important advantage”. Although policymakers recognize that lobbyists may have
valuable private information, they are quite aware of the strategic incentives for lobbyists
in presenting or withholding this information (see, e.g. Zeigler and Baer, 1969, p. 109;
Schlozman and Tierney, 1986, p. 298). According to Appels (1985, p. 308): “This need
not imply outright lie or dishonest manipulation, although these cannot be excluded with
certainty”. Thus, it seems that basic features of real-life lobbying are represented by our
game: there is asymmetric information, with S (the sender) holding information which is
valuable for R (the responder); there is mutual dependence, because S is affected by the
action of R; there is interaction, when S tries to inﬂuence R by sending messages; and
there are partially conﬂicting interests, since S sometimes has an incentive to misinform
or to withhold information from R. Furthermore, our game echoes the fact that lobbying
(unlike, for example, market exchange) typically takes place in an environment with a
‘thin’institutionalstructure.Incombination,thesefeaturesalsomakethegamestrategically
interesting, and not at all trivial.
Of course, one could question whether the subjects took the experiment seriously. Also,
as a study of lobbying, one could argue that the experimental design perhaps eliminated
essentialaspectsofthelobbyingenvironmentintheﬁeld(cf.inthiscontextDyerandKagel,
1996, on the winner’s curse). Although it is impossible to provide a deﬁnitive answer,
we have the following arguments in support of our study. Regarding the ﬁrst issue, there
is no indication from observations during or discussions after the experimental sessions,
nor from responses to a debrieﬁng questionnaire, that one should be worried about the
seriousnesswithwhichbothtypesofsubjectsdeterminedtheirdecisions. 22 Withrespectto
theexperimentaldesignwehavethefollowingarguments,inadditiontotheonesmentioned
above. First, comments collected during a seminar presented at a public affairs consultancy
ﬁrm (before the experiment, but with different professionals) gave support to the relevance
of the design. Of course, other issues of interest were mentioned — such as the use of
intermediate agents — but these related more to adding complexity to the experiment.
Second, it is noted that there is at present a strongly felt need of enhancing the degree of
professionalization in this ﬁeld (this was also a central issue at the conferences where the
experiments with the professionals were run). This makes it perhaps less surprising why
few, but nevertheless interesting, subject-pool effects were detected in the experiment.
In view of the differences found between the two subject pools, an important method-
ological question is whether one can use student subjects as a surrogate for professionals
in this ﬁeld of research (lobbying or public affairs). We believe that an afﬁrmative answer
is justiﬁed. First, although we found some statistically signiﬁcant differences, the size of
these differential effects is generally small. Second, for by far most of the professional
subjects (80%) there are no differences with the students at all (with the exception of a
somewhat larger value of sb). Third, if the differences turn out to be robust and systematic
one could adjust the data obtained with student subjects in these respects. Fourth, and most
22 Forinstance,theresponsestothequestionnaireshowedthatonlytwoprofessionalsubjectsfoundtheexperiment
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importantly, for the analysis of comparative-statics effects and the effects of alternative
institutions student subjects remain useful, because the direction of the effects is generally
the same.
With respect to the last argument, it is noted that in case of lobbying, as in other ﬁelds
of interest, the more interesting questions are rather of a qualitative (comparative-statics)
nature than of the point-estimate type. As Kagel and Roth (1992, p. 1389) put it: “We
think that much of the potential contribution of experimental methods lies in their ability to
provideserioustestsofthebasiccomparative-staticimplicationsofhypothesesofeconomic
interest”.Thus,insteadofquestionslike:Whatistheprecisefrequencywithwhichinﬂuence
attempts are undertaken by lobbyists? or: How often exactly are policymakers persuaded
by the messages of lobbyists?, the more interesting questions would seem to be: How does
information disclosure interact with (partial) conﬂicts of interests?, How is the degree of
information disclosure related to the stakes involved in informing and misinforming? or:
How does the inﬂuence on policymakers depend on the ease of access and the cost of
messages?
It is these types of questions that we addressed in our earlier theoretical paper (Potters
and van Winden, 1992), and the subsequent experimental test (Potters and van Winden,
1996). The main conclusion from the latter paper is that game theory (sequential equilib-
rium) is helpful in organizing the experimental data, but fails as a good predictor of the
comparative-statics. It turned out that a decision–theoretic model, supplemented with be-
lief learning, served best in organizing the comparative-statics properties of the data. This
conclusion is mainly based on the ﬁndings that the student subjects responded strongly to
changes in own payoff parameters (contrary to the prediction of mixed strategy sequential
equilibrium), and that the impact of experience was in the direction of best response to
history. For these two main results of our earlier paper, we do not ﬁnd a difference between
students and professionals. 23 Thus, it appears that, even though we ﬁnd some differences
between the precise point estimates of the behavior of students and professionals, these
differences do not affect the more interesting comparative-statics properties of their behav-
ior, that is, the extent and the direction of behavioral changes in response to environmental
parameters.
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The following is an exact translation from Dutch of the instructions for the pen and paper
sessions.
A.1. Introduction hReception Roomi
Youareabouttoparticipateinanexperimentalstudyofdecisionmaking.Theexperiment
consists of two parts. In total the experiment will last about 2h. Before you will be invited
to the laboratory, we ask you to draw one envelope from this box.
In the envelope you will ﬁnd your ‘registration number’, which will be used throughout
the experiment, and an indication of your role in the ﬁrst part of the experiment. There are
two roles: ‘participant A’ and ‘participant B’. In the envelope, it is announced whether you
have the role of participant A or B. One envelope is an exception to this rule. Instead of
‘participant A’ or ‘participant B’ this envelope contains the announcement ‘monitor’. The
monitor will watch us while we carry out the experiment and assist us from time to time.
The monitor receives a payment of 40 guilders.
After you have taken an envelope, you are invited to enter the laboratory and take a
seat behind a table reserved for an A or B participant. As you will see clearly indicated,
participants A sit together in one part and participants B in another part of the room. A
separate table is reserved for the monitor.
From the moment you have drawn an envelope you are no longer allowed to talk or
communicate to the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand and
one of us will come to your table. As soon as everyone has taken his or her seat in the
laboratory, we will distribute further instructions and read them aloud.
Are there any questions about what has been said up till now? If not, then the person on
the left of me is now requested to ﬁrst pick an envelope, open it and go the laboratory.
A.2. Instructions
A.2.1. Introduction
This is an experimental study of decision making. Various research institutions have
provided funds for this study. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully
youmayearnaconsiderableamountofmoney.Allthemoneyyouearnisyourstokeep.Your
payoffs will be paid to you in cash, privately and conﬁdentially, after the experiment.518 J. Potters, F. van Winden/J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 43 (2000) 499–522
We will begin by reading these instructions. Thereafter, you will have the opportunity to
ask questions.
A.2.2. Decisions and earnings
Theexperimentwillconsistoftwoseparateparts,andeachpartwillconsistofanumberof
periods.IneachperiodaparticipantAwillbematchedwithaparticipantB.Bothparticipants
will have to take one decision during the period. The earnings for A and B depend upon
the decisions made, but are codetermined by the color of a disk. The color of the disk
can be either black or white. At the beginning of each period the color of the disk will
be determined by a drawing. The probability that a white or a black disk is drawn will
be announced to both participants. The outcome of the drawing, however, will only be
announced to participant A. Hence, participant A knows the color, whereas B only knows
the probabilities of a white and a black disk. At the beginning of each period participant A
decides whether or not to send a message to participant B. In case of a message, there is
a choice between the announcement (the disk is) ‘white’ and the announcement (the disk
is) ‘black’. The announcement is allowed to differ from the real color. Sending a message
bears a cost to participant A; the costs of a message will be stated in guilders.
Thus, the decision by participant A can either be a message, stating ‘white’ or ‘black’,o r
no message. This decision will then be communicated to participant B. Each B participant
will be notiﬁed of only one decision, namely, the decision of the A participant to whom
he or she has been matched in that period. After taking notice of A’s decision, participant
B decides whether to react with choice B1o rchoice B2. This decision (choice) will then
be communicated to participant A and, ﬁnally, the color of the disk will be announced
to B.
The earnings of A and B are (apart form the costs of a message) determined by the
disk’s color (white or black) and B’s decision. These earnings are presented in tables on
the sheet called DESCRIPTION, which has already been distributed hsee belowi. You are
now requested to take this sheet. In order to demonstrate that all of you have the same
information, this sheet will also be projected on the wall.
First, you see the probabilities that the disk’s color is white or black. Next, it is again
indicated that participant A takes a decision whether or not to send a message, before
participant B determines her or his choice. In case of a message, a choice must be made
between the announcements ‘white’ and ‘black’. The costs of a message are posted in
guilders.
Finally you see two tables. The left table presents A’s earnings and the right one presents
B’s. If you want to know a participant’s earnings with a particular color of the disk and a
particular choice by B, you ﬁrst move to the table indicating ‘earnings participant A’ or
‘earnings participant B’. Then you look up the color of the disk (white or black) and you
move to the right to the column indicating the choice of B (choice B1 or choice B2). The
ﬁgures are stated in guilders. For A participants, the costs of a message must be subtracted
if a message was sent.
A.2.3. The monitor
At the beginning of each period the monitor will perform the drawing that determines
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From time to time we will ask the monitor whether we are actually conducting the
experiment in the manner speciﬁed in the instructions. The monitor will be expected to
answer these questions with a simple yes or no. The monitor will also assist us with the
experiment. The monitor will not be permitted to communicate with the rest of you in any
way.
The monitor is now requested to show the disks to the participants, in order to check
whether the probability of a white and a black disk is in accordance with the probabilities
stated on the sheet DESCRIPTION hThere always was one black disk and either one or two
white disks. We also asked the monitor to show the urn and ﬁlmcases for the disks and to
turn them upside donei.
A.2.4. Recording of the results
Now both A and B participants are requested to pick one envelope from the appropriate
box and to open the envelope.
Take the enclosed sheet, called RECORD SHEET, and put your registration number in
theupperleftcorner.Theregistrationnumberisneededtomakesurethattherightpayments
are made to the right person. On the next line you see your role (A or B) in this part of the
experiment. The table is also projected on the wall.
Now, ﬁrst look at the ﬁrst (left) column of the table. The ﬁgures in this column indicate
the period, starting with period 0 and ending with period 10. Period 0 is a practice period.
The results (earnings) of this period are not included in the payments at the end of the
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The next column (the second from the left) contains a codeletter. This codeletter makes it
easierforustoregistertheresults.Thecodeletterdeterminestheparticipantintheotherrole
you are matched with in a particular period. Each period you are matched with a different
person; furthermore, in periods 1–10 you are matched with the same person at most twice.
We have determined the sequence before the experiment in an arbitrary way, so you cannot
know whom you are matched with in a any period.
Eachperiodwillproceedasfollows.Afterthecolorhasbeendeterminedbythemonitor’s
draw, this color will be communicated to the A participants. They will mark this color in
the column called ‘the color is’ of their RECORD SHEET. Then participant A takes her or
his decision to send or not to send a message (‘white’ or ‘black’) to B. Participant A will
mark this decision in the column called ‘A’s decision (message)’. We will then note this
decision on the RECORD SHEET of the appropriate B participant. Participant B will then
make her or his decision (choice B1 or choice B2) and mark it in the column ‘B’s decision’.
We will then note this decision on A’s sheet and, simultaneously, the monitor will mark the
color of the disk in the column ‘the color is’ of the B participants.
The last two columns concern the payoffs. At the end of each period you will use
the tables of the sheet DESCRIPTION to determine your payoffs for that period. These
payoffs must be noted in the column called ‘your payoffs’. Finally, for the sake of com-
pleteness, a column is included in which you are supposed to register the payoffs of the
participant with whom you are matched in a particular period. For A participants account
must be taken of the costs of a message in case A has decided to send a message in that
period.
We will also register all the information.
A.2.5. Summary
Each period begins with the monitor drawing the color of the disk. After the outcome has
been communicated to participant A, he or she decides whether or not to send a message to
participant B. After this decision has been communicated, it is B’s turn to take a decision
(choice B1 or choice B2), notknowing the result of the draw (the disk’s color). Finally,
B’s decision is communicated to A and the disk’s color to B. With this information the
participants determine the payoffs for that period, on the basis of the tables on the sheet
DESCRIPTION. The next periods will proceed in exactly the same way until and including
period 10.
Thereafter, the sheets for part 2 of the experiment will be distributed, and the new in-
structions will be read.
A.2.6. Final remarks
Attheendoftoday’ssessionyouwillbeaskedtoanswersomequestionsfortheevaluation
of the experiment. After that you will be called by your registration number to privately
collect your payoffs in cash at the secretariat. Your payoffs are your own business: you do
not have to discuss them with anyone.
It is not allowed to talk or communicate with other participants during the experiment.
If you have any questions please raise your hand and one of us will come to your table.
Description hsheet referred to in A.2.2.i
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 The urn contains one white and one black disk. Hence, the probabilities that a white is
drawn is 2/3 and the probability that a black disk is drawn is 1/3.
 Participant A decides whether or not to send a message — ‘white’ or ‘black’ — before
participant B makes her or his choice. A message bears a cost of f 0.50 to participant A.
 The earnings to participant A (excluding any message cost) and participant B are pre-
sented in the tables below. The earnings are dependent upon the disk’s color (the color
























The instructions and design of the computerized sessions are identical to those of the pen
and paper sessions except for the following:
 All choices were made on, and communicated by, the computer.
 The Description sheet with the payoff tables (see above) was projected on the computer
screen throughout the experiment (and on the wall, as in the pen and paper sessions).
 The Record Sheet (see above) was projected on the computer screen.
 In the pen and paper sessions subjects had to calculate their own and their opponent’s
payoffs. We checked these calculations, which gave us information on whether they
understood the game situation. In the computer sessions, the computer calculated the
payoffs. To have a check on whether they understood the calculation, subjects had to
answer four simple questions concerning the calculation of the payoffs before playing
the game. For the same reason — forcing the subjects to look through the payoff tables
— two practice periods were held.
 The debrieﬁng questionnaire was per computer.
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